This paper uses the lessons of history to identify the sources of monetary policy successes and failures in the past and to suggest a strategy for choosing successful Federal Reserve chairs in the future. It demonstrates that since at least the mid-1930s, the key determinant of the quality of monetary policy has been policymakers' beliefs about how the economy functions and what monetary policy can accomplish. When the Federal Reserve chairman and other policymakers have believed that inflation is costly, that inflation responds to the deviation of output from a moderate estimate of capacity, and that monetary policy can affect output and prices, as was the case in the 1950s and the 1980s and beyond, policy was well tempered and macroeconomic outcomes were desirable. When policymakers held other beliefs, such as the view that monetary policy cannot stimulate a depressed economy or that slack is ineffective in reducing inflation, as was the case in the 1930s and the 1970s, policy and outcomes were undesirable. This finding suggests that the key characteristic to look for in future Federal Reserve chairs is a sound economic framework. The paper shows that the best predictor of the beliefs previous chairmen held while in office are their prior writings, speeches, and confirmation hearings. Therefore, in choosing future chairs, it is crucial to evaluate the intellectual frameworks of potential nominees, and to reject candidates whose views are worrisome.
An obvious question is why monetary policy has been so much more successful under some Federal Reserve chairmen than others. This question has taken on new urgency because current chairman Alan Greenspan will need to be replaced in the near future. It is therefore crucial to understand what has determined policy success in the past and to identify factors that help predict success. Only by learning the lessons of history will we be able to choose a new Federal Reserve chair who is likely to replicate our policy triumphs and avoid our policy failures. This paper demonstrates that the key determinants of policy success have been policymakers' views about how the economy works and what monetary policy can accomplish. In the first major section of the paper, we establish this link between beliefs and policy outcomes. We analyze the narrative record of the Federal Reserve to discover what policymakers believed and why they chose the policies they did.
We find that the well-tempered monetary policies of the 1950s and 1980s and '90s stemmed from a conviction that inflation has high costs and few benefits, together with realistic views about the sustainable level of unemployment and the determinants of inflation. In contrast, the profligate policies of the late 1960s and 1970s stemmed initially from a belief in a permanent tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, and later from a natural rate framework with a highly optimistic estimate of the natural rate and a highly pessimistic estimate of the sensitivity of inflation to slack. And the deflationary policies of the late 1930s stemmed from a belief that the economy could overheat at low levels of capacity utilization and that monetary ease could do little to stimulate a depressed economy. 1 The clear implication of this link between ideas and policy outcomes is that in choosing a successor to Alan Greenspan, the key criterion should be economic beliefs. But does the historical record suggest ways of predicting what a Federal Reserve chair will believe while in office? In the second major section of the paper, we find that looking at experience and resumes can provide some information.
However, much better predictions of the views that Federal Reserve chairmen held during their tenures come from their speeches, writings, and testimony prior to being confirmed. Both Federal Reserve chairmen with beliefs that led to moderate policies and successful outcomes, such as Greenspan, and those with views that led to undesirable policies and poor outcomes, such as Miller, clearly revealed their beliefs before they were appointed. Thus, the way to choose a good Federal Reserve chair is to read what candidates have said about how the economy operates and ask them about their economic beliefs. If what a candidate says is unrealistic or poorly reasoned, move on to another candidate or risk a replay of the 1930s or the 1970s.
THE KEY ROLE OF IDEAS IN DETERMINING POLICY AND OUTCOMES
To determine what monetary policymakers believed in different eras, we take the straightforward We use the same narrative sources to establish the link between policymakers' beliefs and policy actions. We look at what policymakers said they were doing and why. As a supplement to this narrative analysis of policy, we look at estimates of the real interest rate and indicators of economic outcomes. Table 1 presents a thumbnail guide to our findings about monetary policymakers' beliefs and the policies those beliefs inspired in different eras.
The Eccles Era
Marriner Eccles became Federal Reserve chairman in March 1936. The most important element of monetary policymakers' beliefs during the late 1930s was the notion that speculative excesses and demand-induced inflation could occur in an economy with underused capacity. In this view, full employment was not the dividing line between normal and overheated conditions. Rather, it was possible to have "the development of inflationary trends before a full recovery has been attained" (Minutes, 3/22/37, p. 6; see also 3/15/37, p. 12) . This view was clearly expressed by the associate economist to the Board. In late 1936, when unemployment was still over 13 percent, he warned that "care should be taken to prevent any maladjustments of the economic structure from possible over-stimulation" (11/19/36, p. 2).
2 Similarly, a number of FOMC members expressed concern about demand-driven inflation despite widespread agreement that the recovery was far from complete. For example, in March 1937, George Harrison, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, said that expansionary open market operations "might well add unwise stimulus to the inflation of prices" (3/15/37, p. 9; see also 4/3/37, p.
9).
Policymakers believed that a key mechanism by which inflation and speculative excess could arise in a depressed economy was overly easy credit. The FOMC drew a distinction between "legitimate business use" of credit and unproductive speculative uses, and worried that overly easy credit could set off speculation in commodity and asset markets (Minutes, 3/15/37, . A corollary of this view was that the FOMC was deeply "concerned … over the current and potential effects on both the credit and banking situation of the continued increase in the excess reserves of member banks" (11/20/36, p. 10).
The meetings in late 1936 and early 1937 were full of discussions of the dangers of the large and growing volume of bank reserves above the statutory minimum (see, for example, 11/19/36, pp. 1-2; 1/26/37, pp. 1-8; and 3/15/37, pp. 7-8) . A central reason given for this concern was that "a further increase in excess reserves of member banks might give added impetus to existing inflationary tendencies" (3/23/37, pp. 3-4).
In addition, the FOMC had little faith that monetary expansion could have salutary effects. For example, in November 1937, the economist to the Board urged monetary expansion but "not with the thought that it would cure the situation" (Minutes, 11/29/37, p. 7). Likewise, Harrison said it was a question "whether the System appropriately could take any action which would tend to check a recession and to facilitate the continuation of recovery" (9/11/37, p. 9). He implied that if the depressed level of output was not the result of tight credit, loosening would be of little value. Eccles suggested that adding to excess reserves in a downturn could have at most "a desirable psychological effect" (12/30/38, p. 16).
Monetary policy actions in this period reflected policymakers' beliefs. The most significant action was a doubling of reserve requirements from August 1936 to May 1937. The Board took this step because it feared that existing excess reserves could "create an injurious credit expansion" (Report, 1936, p. 217) . According to the statement released in July 1936 in anticipation of the first part of the increase, "the Board decided to lock up this part of the present volume of member bank reserves as a measure of prevention on the one hand and of further encouragement to sound business recovery and confidence in the long-term investment market on the other hand" (p. 217). The economist to the Board argued that raising reserve requirements would help "prevent the development of unsound and speculative situations" (Minutes, 1/26/37, p. 3). Policymakers also felt that "the increase in reserve requirements was fully justified in order to put the System in position to exercise credit control through open market operations whenever such action appeared to be necessary" (3/15/37, p. 9; see also 1/26/37, pp. 5-7). While the official statements stressed that such control could be used for expansion or contraction, it is clear that what the Federal Reserve gained through the elimination of excess reserves was the ability to tighten. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue forcefully that the rise in reserve requirements was the key cause of the recession that began in May 1937. As Eccles realized shortly after the March 1937 increase, "banks have been accustomed … to an extremely large amount of excess reserves … and … it would take the banks some time to accustom themselves to operating with a smaller amount of excess, as evidenced by the fact that they had sold earning assets rather than reduce their balances with correspondents"
(Minutes, 4/3/37, p. 7). Bank lending declined and the money supply fell sharply in the wake of the increases in reserve requirements. Figure 1 shows the behavior of the unemployment rate starting in January 1934; Figure 2 shows the behavior of the inflation rate. Unemployment rose dramatically in 1938, and prices switched from rising slowly to falling.
As the recession deepened, the FOMC largely refused to act. This response stemmed from the belief that monetary expansion could do little to encourage recovery. For example, in December 1937, the committee felt that "the existing volume of excess reserves and of supplies of private capital is abundant at this time at low rates for continuance of easy credit conditions and for meeting all credit requirements of commerce, business, and agriculture." Therefore, "effective action to meet and overcome the present business recession should be taken outside the field of the System's various monetary powers"
(Minutes, 12/1/37, p. 2; see also 12/13/37, p. 2, and 3/1/38, p. 6). When the Treasury decided to monetize gold in April 1938 to try to stimulate the economy, the FOMC actually debated whether it should sell bonds to counteract the Treasury's actions (4/21/38, pp. 7-10). Figure 3 shows estimates of the ex ante real interest rate, which is arguably the most fundamental indicator of the stance of monetary policy. The derivation of this series is discussed in the appendix. The real interest rate was substantially negative during most of the mid-1930s, as gold inflows expanded the money supply greatly and generated expectations of inflation. (Romer and Romer, 2002b) . Policymakers in this period were emphatic that higher inflation would not increase output and employment in the long run; indeed, they believed that its longrun effects were negative. For example, Martin stated in 1958: "If inflation should begin to develop again, it might be that the number of unemployed would be temporarily reduced …, but there would be a larger amount of unemployment for a long time to come" (Minutes, 8/19/58, p. 57 ; see also 12/7/54, p.
22, and 9/22/59, p. 8). Martin often made statements very similar to ones Volcker and Greenspan would make decades later about the importance of low inflation for long-run growth. In 1957, for example, he said: "stability in the value of the dollar" and "sustained economic growth" "are inseparable. Price stability is essential to sustainable growth. Inflation fosters maladjustments" (Bulletin, August 1957, p. 869; see also March 1952, p. 244, and February 1959, p. 118.) . Indeed, Martin may have taken aversion to inflation to an extreme; for example, he argued that "a gradual rise in prices …, averaging perhaps 2 per cent a year," if allowed to continue indefinitely, "would work incalculable hardship" (August 1957, p. 872 ).
In addition, policymakers had an intuitive natural rate framework of inflation dynamics. For example, in 1955 one member of the FOMC said, "The economy was moving nearer capacity in many respects, and as this point approached less efficient means of production would be utilized and prices would tend to rise" (Minutes, 10/4/55, p. 8) . Similarly, in 1953, Martin stated, "when an economy is running at peak levels of production and employment, creating more money will not create more things to buy. It can only bid up the prices of available supplies" (Bulletin, May 1953, p. 453 Finally, policymakers in the 1950s, in contrast to their predecessors in the 1930s, believed that monetary policy could help both limit expansion in good times and stimulate recovery during recessions.
As Martin said in 1952: "Basically, the job of the Federal Reserve System is that of monetary management -to increase the money supply and make it more easily available when there is evidence of weakness in the economy and to reduce the volume of money and make it less easily available when indications show that there is excessive expansion" (Bulletin, April 1952, p. 348) . He later gave the more colorful description: "Our purpose is to lean against the winds of deflation or inflation, whichever way they are blowing" (U.S. Senate, 1956, p. 5 forcefully to economic conditions, but had no systematic tendency toward expansion or contraction, is consistent with their generally moderate beliefs. The result of these policies was that inflation was low and real fluctuations were small. As Figure 2 shows, inflation was typically under 2 percent in the 1950s and early 1960s. Figure 1 shows that there were three recessions between 1950 and 1961, but that they were typically short and fairly mild.
The prevailing intellectual framework at the Federal Reserve changed radically in the 1960s, however. Interestingly, this is one time when the chairman's views did not dominate the FOMC. Martin continued to hold the same views he held in the 1950s. 3 But he also believed that policy should be made by consensus, and that the Federal Reserve's independence was -and should be -limited (Kettl, 1986, and Meltzer, 2003) . As a result, when the Administration and other FOMC members adopted the "New Economics," Martin acquiesced.
A key feature of the Administration's beliefs was that there was a permanent unemploymentinflation tradeoff, so that "the choice of the ideal level of utilization is a social judgment that requires a balancing of national goals of high employment and reasonable price stability" (Economic Report of the President, 1969, p. 62 And in early 1968, when unemployment was 3.7 percent and the FOMC expected rapid real GNP growth, the Committee's main concern was not that inflation might increase, but merely that it might continue (Report, 1968, p. 115 ; see also p. 117).
The change in views had a major impact on monetary policy in the second half of the 1960s.
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Despite rapid output growth, high resource use, and rising inflation, the FOMC did not tighten. The real interest rate series in Figure 3 is essentially flat at a moderate level over this period. The reason appears to have been policymakers' belief in a long-run tradeoff and their optimistic assessments of the economy's capacity. A typical sentiment was that of the member who said in early 1968 that he "did not think the Committee should change its position. There was considerable evidence that the main thrust of existing inflationary pressures might be of a short-run nature, and that those pressures might end by the middle of 1968" (Minutes, 1/9/68, pp. 68-69). Armed with expansionary fiscal policy and accommodative monetary policy, the economy expanded rapidly, with unemployment dropping to 3.4 percent. Inflation began to creep up; by the end of the decade it was 6 percent.
There was a final shift in views at the very end of Martin's tenure. The Nixon Administration's policymakers (under the leadership of chief domestic policy adviser Arthur Burns) believed that the change in inflation depended on the gap between actual unemployment and the natural rate, and thus that there was no long-run tradeoff. The new administration's first Economic Report argued that "inflations have seldom ended without a temporary rise in unemployment," and that under the disinflationary policies it intended to follow, in the short run "output will be below its potential and the rate of inflation, while declining, will probably still be too high" (1970, pp. 21, 65) . Since Martin's own beliefs were still those he had held in the 1950s, he welcomed this shift in views (Wells, 1994 percent," and "We must now have the patience to wait for the improvement in price performance that will eventually result" (Bulletin, March 1970, pp. 248-49) . The staff forecasts presented at the meetings in 1970 consistently predicted renewed growth, but nevertheless some moderation in inflation (see, for example, Report, 1970, pp. 99, 133, 145) .
The FOMC loosened substantially during Burns's first two months as chairman and then loosened consistently beginning in June 1970. The narrative record, while not crystal clear, certainly
suggests that the policy was motivated by economic beliefs. With unemployment at or slightly below 5 percent in previous months, policymakers believed that "expectations of continuing inflation had abated considerably." They voted to ease because they felt it was possible for policy to be "sufficiently stimulative to foster moderate growth in real economic activity, but not … risk a resurgence of inflationary expectations" (Report, 1970, pp. 148-49) . Their optimistic estimate of the natural rate appears to have made them feel that expansionary policy was not inconsistent with their goal of lowering actual inflation to validate the reduced expectations.
When inflation failed to fall as quickly as policymakers had hoped, they responded by becoming dramatically more pessimistic about the downward responsiveness of inflation to slack. In July 1971,
Burns testified:
A year or two ago it was generally expected that extensive slack in resource use, such as we have been experiencing, would lead to significant moderation in the inflationary spiral. This has not happened, either here or abroad. The rules of economics are not working in quite the way they used to. Despite extensive unemployment in our country, July 1971, p. 596). In taking this position, Burns was going against his allies in the White House, so there can be no political motivation (Kettl, 1986, pp. 120-25) . Instead, Burns became a vocal advocate for controls precisely because he felt that aggregate demand restraint was no longer an effective way of dealing with inflation (see, for example, Bulletin, July 1971, p. 596, and November 1971, pp. 917-18) .
The expansionary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve in the early 1970s was reflected in the real interest rate and economic outcomes. The real interest rate shown in Figure 3 averaged close to zero during Burns's first three years in office, and was at times strongly negative. Figure 1 shows that the unemployment rate fell steadily from 1971 to late 1973. As Figure 2 shows, the price controls do appear to have reduced inflation temporarily. However, inflation began to rise steadily once controls were relaxed in January 1973. That the Federal Reserve ran such expansionary policy at a time when unemployment was falling and inflation was rising is exactly what one would expect given the economic model held by monetary policymakers at the time.
In the mid-1970s, the extreme pessimism within the FOMC about the sensitivity of inflation to slack gave way to a renewed belief that conventional aggregate demand restraint could reduce inflation.
For example, in February 1974, Burns testified: "The objective of public policy in these difficult circumstances must be to establish a dependable framework for a gradual return to price stability over the next few years. In this endeavor we will need to rely principally on sound management of aggregate demand through general monetary and fiscal policies" (Bulletin, February 1974, p. 105) . In contrast to his earlier exhortations on the ineffectiveness of slack, Burns in 1974 expressed the view that "A slower pace of economic activity, both here and abroad, may well cause a decline in the prices of industrial raw materials and internationally traded commodities" (March 1974, p. 210 ).
This renewed confidence in the usefulness of slack was accompanied by an increase in estimates of the natural rate. In February 1977, when unemployment was 7.5 percent, Burns said "As the pace of economic activity quickens in coming months, pressures could develop for larger and more widespread increases in wages and prices than we have recently experienced" (Bulletin, February 1977, pp. 121-22;  see also March 1977, p. 226) . In December 1977, when the unemployment rate was 6.4 percent, another FOMC member suggested that "the high rate of unemployment was a structural problem that could not be solved with monetary policy" (Report, 1977, p. 319 ; see also p. 276).
This greatly increased estimate of the natural rate was also revealed in Burns's diagnosis of the inflation of the 1970s. He placed little emphasis on supply factors, and took pains to point out that the inflation besetting nearly every country was the result of excessive aggregate demand stimulus. For example, in September 1974 he testified: "For many years, our economy and that of most other nations has been subject to an underlying inflationary bias that has merely been magnified by special influences.
… governments have often lost control of their budgets, and deficit spending has become a habitual practice. In many countries, monetary policy has supplied an inflationary element on its own, besides accommodating fiscal excesses" (Bulletin, October 1974, p. 703) .
The changes in beliefs in the mid-1970s were reflected in monetary policy actions. In 1974, the Federal Reserve adopted a significantly contractionary policy at a time when output was already falling.
The Federal Reserve was explicit about its motivation. Burns testified in August: "For a time, we should be prepared to tolerate a slower rate of economic growth and a higher rate of unemployment than any of us would like. A period of slow growth is needed to permit an unwinding of the inflationary processes that have been built into our economy through years of neglect" (Bulletin, August 1974, p. 566) . In September, when unemployment was 5.9 percent, Burns stated that he "would not wish to see a prompt recovery in economic activity. If recovery began promptly, economic activity would turn up at a time when inflation was continuing at a two-digit rate" (Minutes, 9/10/74, p. 65). This view was seconded by other FOMC members (see, for example, pp. 66, 68, 80). policy became dramatically more expansionary. Given that inflation was rising and unemployment was falling, this expansion was a stark deviation from modern practice. Interestingly, we see no obvious change in beliefs that would explain this behavior. Greider (1987, pp. 346-47) suggests that Burns may have expanded in an effort to win renomination from President Carter. Thus, this appears to be one time when politics or personal ambition, rather than economic beliefs, drove policy. Figures 1 and 2 show that the loosening of policy was accompanied by a substantial fall in unemployment and a surge in inflation at the very end of the Burns era. 119). The view that the natural rate was clearly below 5.9 percent was a decided change from the much higher levels of the natural rate mentioned just the year before.
One sign of this new optimism was that the Federal Reserve attributed the increases in inflation in this period to various special factors, such as reduced supplies of agricultural goods, increases in the minimum wage, and depreciation of the dollar, rather than to demand pressure (see, for example, Bulletin, November 1978, p, 843, and Report, 1979, p. 139 demand must not be permitted to expand to the point at which it presses excessively on available supplies of labor and industrial resources. This means that real GNP at this juncture probably should not grow at an annualized rate much above 3 percent, in line with the prospective growth of potential output" (Bulletin, November 1978, p. 844) . The Federal Reserve clearly thought that the prevailing unemployment rate of 5.9 percent was above the natural rate. And certainly, the estimated growth rate of potential output was quite high. These optimistic beliefs are particularly striking given that by 1978 the U.S. economy had been suffering from unemployment-increasing demographic changes and the productivity growth slowdown for some time.
A perhaps even more important change in beliefs was the reemergence of the view that slack could do little to reduce inflation. Miller testified in March 1978: "Our attempts to restrain inflation by using conventional stabilization techniques have been less than satisfactory. Three years of high unemployment and underutilized capital stock have been costly in terms both of lost production and the denial to many of the dignity that comes from holding a productive job. Yet, despite this period of substantial slack in the economy, we still have a serious inflation problem" (Bulletin, March 1978, p. 193) . This concern about the difficulty of reducing inflation was echoed by other members of the FOMC (see, for example, Report, 1978, p. 210, and 1979, pp. 161-62) .
Policymakers' beliefs were again reflected in the policies they chose. Members of the FOMC expressed grave concern about inflation and genuinely wanted to reduce it. But their optimistic estimates of the natural rate led them to avoid seriously contractionary actions. Miller testified: "The Federal
Reserve, for its part, is continuing to pursue a monetary policy that aims at a reduction of inflationary pressures while encouraging continued economic growth and high levels of employment" (Bulletin, December 1978, p. 943) . Policymakers' belief that slack would have little impact on inflation reinforced their conviction that they should avoid genuine contraction. This sentiment was expressed in 1979 when
Miller testified: "The Federal Reserve does not consider a recession desirable. 'Stop-go' patterns of economic growth have … brought no lasting relief from inflation" (February 1979, p. 120) .
The belief that aggregate demand restriction was not an effective way to reduce inflation also led the Federal Reserve to advocate various non-monetary policies. In early 1978, Miller testified that aggregate demand policies "need to be complemented by programs designed to enhance competition and to correct structural problems, in particular labor and product markets" (Bulletin, March 1978, pp. 193-94) . Similarly, the February 1979 "Monetary Policy Report to Congress" concluded that "it may be necessary to augment monetary and fiscal policies with carefully focused programs to facilitate job placement and to provide skill training" (March 1979, p. 189) .
Our estimate of the real interest rate given in Figure 3 A fundamental tenet of monetary policymakers over the past quarter century has been the critical importance of low inflation. High inflation, in this view, disrupts the economy and depresses long-run growth. For example, Volcker stated in 1981, "we must not lose sight of the fundamental point that so many of the accumulated distortions and pressures in the economy can be traced to our high and stubborn inflation." He went on to say, "progress on inflation is a prerequisite for … sustained, balanced growth" (Bulletin, August 1981, pp. 613, 616) . Similarly, Greenspan testified in 1995, "I believe firmly that a key ingredient in achieving the highest possible levels of productivity, real incomes, and living standards is the achievement of price stability" (April 1995, p. 342) . Indeed, both Volcker and Greenspan stressed the benefits of low inflation virtually every time they testified to Congress about monetary policy during their tenures.
A second central element of policymakers' beliefs has been a conventional view of inflation behavior: inflation responds to the output gap, and there is no substitute for aggregate demand restraint in the process of disinflation. In 1980, Volcker said, "Monetary policy -restraint on growth of money and credit -is only effective over time; but experience shows that, with perseverance, it can and will be effective" (Bulletin, February 1980, p. 140; see also March 1980, p. 214) . His comments about even mild incomes policies were few and not encouraging (February 1980, p. 142, and August 1983, p. 604 ).
Greenspan held similar views of inflation dynamics. In 1993, for example, he argued that real interest rates "persisting above [their equilibrium] level, history tells us, tend to be associated with slack, disinflation, and economic stagnation, and rates below that level tend to be associated with eventual resource bottlenecks and rising inflation" (September 1993, p. 853; see also April 1995, p. 342).
A final key ingredient of modern policymakers' economic framework has been a relatively high estimate of the natural rate. Under Volcker, policymakers believed that the level of unemployment needed to reduce inflation was substantial. In March 1980, for example, when the staff forecast projected unemployment to rise above 8 percent, FOMC members expected that "the underlying inflation rate would not be reduced very much in the short run by the rather moderate contraction in activity generally being projected" (Report, 1980, p. 108; see also 1981, p. 116) . During the first decade of Greenspan's tenure, estimates of the natural rate were certainly lower than in the Volcker era. For example, in 1994, with unemployment slightly above 6 percent, Greenspan testified that "the amount of slack in the economy, though difficult to judge, appears to have become relatively small" (Bulletin, September 1994, p. 794). However, these estimates were still relatively high considering the changes in the U.S. labor market toward lower normal unemployment that occurred in the 1990s.
Policy actions under Volcker and Greenspan have followed from policymakers' beliefs. The
Volcker disinflation is the most striking example: the FOMC's central focus on low inflation, its belief that slack would reduce inflation and that other policies would not, and its high estimate of the natural rate led it to respond to the high inflation of the late 1970s with extremely contractionary policy, and to maintain that policy in the face of a severe recession. By our measure, the FOMC increased the real interest rate over 5 percentage points from the third quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 1981, and kept it high until well after the severe recession of 1981-82. As Volcker stated in 1980:
In the past, at critical junctures for economic stabilization policy, we have usually been more preoccupied with the possibility of near-term weakness in economic activity or other objectives than with the implications of our actions for future inflation. ... The result has been our now chronic inflationary problem ....
The broad objective of policy must be to break that ominous pattern. ... Success will require that policy be consistently and persistently oriented to that end. Vacillation and procrastination, out of fears of recession or otherwise, would run grave risks (Bulletin, March 1980, p. 214; see also Report, 1980, pp. 100-02) .
Since the mid-1980s, the Federal Reserve has followed a moderate real interest rate policy; it has raised the real rate when inflation threatened and lowered it when real activity weakened, but never pursued extreme expansion or contraction. For example, the FOMC tightened moderately in the late 1980s in response to a modest resurgence of inflation. Our estimated real interest rate rose roughly 2 percentage points in 1988 and 1989. Greenspan explained: "the current rate of inflation, let alone an increase, is not acceptable, and our policies are designed to reduce inflation in coming years. This restraint will involve ... some slowing in the underlying rate of growth of real GNP" (Bulletin, April 1989, p. 274). Greenspan clearly recognized that the policy could cause a recession, but felt that making progress against inflation was crucial (September 1989, p. 616). Conversely, in response to the 1990-91 recession and the ensuing "credit crunch," the Federal Reserve lowered the real interest rate roughly 3 percentage points in the early 1990s. Greenspan testified in 1994: "Over a period of several years starting in 1989, the Federal Reserve progressively eased its policy stance … in response to evidence of a variety of unusual restraints on spending" (April 1994, p. 304) . These carefully calibrated policies were obviously consistent with the Federal Reserve's emphasis on low inflation and its moderate beliefs about the sustainable level of unemployment. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 , the result of these policies was that inflation was low and recessions were few and mild.
The surprising behavior of inflation beginning in the mid-1990s appears to have led Greenspan and some other members of the FOMC to significantly change their views about the determinants of inflation. Greenspan testified in 2000 that "there is still uncertainty about whether the current level of labor resource utilization can be maintained without generating increased cost and price pressures" (Bulletin, September 2000, pp. 649-50). By raising the possibility that labor market conditions in mid-2000 might be sustainable, he was in effect suggesting that the natural rate might have fallen to 4 percent.
At times, Greenspan also suggested that there had been a qualitative change in inflation behavior. He argued that the economy had become much more competitive, and that as a result, over a considerable range forces that would otherwise cause firms to raise prices would instead prompt them to find offsetting cost reductions. In 1999, for example, he suggested that technological progress had "created a broad range of potential innovations that have granted firms greater ability to profitably displace costly factors of production whenever profit margins have been threatened" (September 1999, p. 627; see also April 1999, p. 247).
The FOMC left the real interest rate essentially unchanged during the strong expansion of the late 1990s. As Figure 1 shows, unemployment fell to levels not seen since the late 1960s. But, in contrast to other episodes when the Federal Reserve did not tighten in the face of strong expansion, inflation did not rise. Although there was clearly a shift in the FOMC's beliefs that could explain its policy, it is hard to know how large a role the shift actually played: inflation was so subdued that even policymakers with conventional views had little grounds for advocating significant tightening.
Taken together, our analysis of the six chairmen's tenures reveals an important pattern. Over the past half-century, certain views about how the economy works have led to moderate policies and desirable outcomes. In particular, under Martin in the 1950s and Volcker and Greenspan after 1979, policymakers believed that inflation had no long-run benefits and, indeed, high long-run costs; that inflation responds to the deviation of output from a moderate estimate of capacity; and that monetary policy can be used both to lower inflation and to stimulate a depressed economy. Because of these beliefs, policymakers in these eras adopted policies designed to restrain inflation and minimize real fluctuations. And, in each case inflation was indeed restrained and the economy avoided "boom-bust" fluctuations in output and employment.
In contrast, whenever policymakers have strayed significantly from these sensible views, the result has been misguided policies and unfortunate outcomes. Under Eccles in the 1930s, the Federal
Reserve believed that demand-induced inflation was possible at unemployment rates of 10 percent, and so adopted a highly restrictive policy that caused a devastating recession. In the 1960s, the majority of the FOMC (though not Martin) believed that sustainable unemployment was very low. Under Burns and
Miller in the 1970s, policymakers believed that the natural rate was quite low and that slack could do little to reduce inflation. The misguided beliefs of the 1960s and '70s led to policies that were systematically too expansionary. As a result, the economy experienced high inflation in these decades and a number of engineered recessions to bring inflation down.
PREDICTING POLICYMAKERS' VIEWS
Our finding that ideas have been the key determinant of policy success has an obvious implication: in choosing the Federal Reserve chair, it is crucial to find someone who will be guided by a has been implicit, for example, in our discussion of beliefs about the natural rate. As we have described,
Greenspan's and Miller's estimates of the natural rate were at times quite similar. Yet, Greenspan's estimate was sensible because it was realistic for the economy at the time, whereas Miller's was not because it was much too low given economic fundamentals during his tenure. Going forward, what is crucial is that a future chair's beliefs be reasonable relative to the economy at the time, in the way that Martin's, Volcker's, and Greenspan's were reasonable relative to the economies they faced. If we can identify factors that predicted the sensible views of these past chairmen, this may help predict whether a future chair's beliefs will be sensible in relation to the economy he or she confronts.
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Predicting Beliefs Using Biographical Information
One way to attempt to predict the quality of chairmen's economic frameworks is to examine their background characteristics. Basic biographical information that could plausibly be related to economic understanding is given in Table 2 . 7 Obviously, because we have only six observations, the most one can hope to see are suggestive patterns.
Formal training in economics has an obvious problem as a predictor of sound understanding of the economy. Burns, who was a distinguished economics professor and president of the National Bureau and Greenspan founded a successful New York consulting firm that had many of the nation's leading banks as clients. In contrast, Eccles was a relatively small-time banker from Utah, and Miller was CEO of a large corporation based in Rhode Island. Both were quite successful in business but were somewhat provincial. That these two had particularly flawed models shows that even extensive business experience does not guarantee a realistic understanding of the economy. Burns, the third chairman with flawed beliefs, also had no significant Wall Street connection.
The three chairmen with the most realistic frameworks also had extensive, relatively non-partisan public service. Martin left Wall Street at age 36, when he was drafted into the army, and served as head Senate, 1933, and Eccles, 1935) .
Other aspects of Eccles's prior views, however, prefigured the Federal Reserve's key beliefs in the second half of the 1930s. Crucially, Eccles believed that monetary expansion by itself could do little to stimulate a depressed economy. For the most part, his view was that monetary expansion that did not get money directly to consumers and firms would have no effect. In 1933, he stated: "you can print money, you can remonetize silver, you can reduce the gold content of the dollar and it is not going to raise your price level unless you start the purchasing power at the source with the consumer" (U.S. Senate, 1933, p. 710 Despite this view, Eccles believed that policymakers needed to be on guard against excessive monetary expansion even in a depressed economy. He worried that such expansion could lead to speculation and inflation. He therefore advocated acting preemptively "to so regulate underlying conditions as to diminish the possibility of a speculative boom getting under way" (U.S. House, 1935, p. 180) . When the possibility of a massive open-market operation to combat the prevailing high levels of unemployment and slack was suggested, he replied, "it would be necessary to increase the reserve requirements by that amount in order to extinguish the reserves; otherwise this operation could carry possibility of credit inflation to almost unknown heights" (p. 322). Similarly, he said: "If we begin to get recovery and private credit begins to expand, ... by the time the banking system had used up their present excess reserves of 2 billion dollars, you would have a volume of money far in excess of anything that the banking system has ever had, ... it seems to me you could have a great inflation" (p. 420). These views clearly presage the FOMC's concern about speculation and excess reserves under Eccles's leadership.
Martin
Martin's public statements and writings were relatively few before he joined the Federal Reserve. Much of Martin's confirmation hearing in March 1951 was spent discussing the Accord. A number of senators expressed concern that Martin's ties to the Treasury would make it difficult for him to assert the Federal Reserve's independence. Martin reassured them by expressing his deep aversion to inflation. When one senator asked, "but do you think it is more dangerous to the country generally to have a continuing inflation such as we have been experiencing, than it is to let the cost of government go a good bit higher than it is?" Martin replied: "I do, I do definitely" (U.S. Senate, 1951, p. 18) . He also said: "I don't want to see interest rates kept low if it is going to promote inflationary pressures. I don't think that is sound, and I don't think that helps matters" (p. 12).
Martin also gave a clear indication of the policies he was likely to follow. He stated, "I shall resist to the nth degree efforts or a temptation that might occur in the Government to debase the currency" (U.S. Senate, 1951, pp. 13-14) . He reiterated both his view that inflation was very costly and his willingness to take harsh measures to fight inflation in the short statement he made upon taking the oath of office: "Unless inflation is controlled, it could prove to be an even more serious threat to the vitality of our country than the more spectacular aggressions of enemies outside our borders. I pledge myself to support all reasonable measures to preserve the purchasing power of the dollar" (Bulletin, April 1951, p. 377). These views formed the core of Martin's economic framework during his tenure as Federal Reserve chairman.
Burns
An important feature of Burns's macroeconomic framework while chairman was that it changed frequently. Thus, his prior statements and writings are inherently unlikely to provide a precise indication of his beliefs while in office. Nevertheless, we do find clear precursors of Burns's views as chairman in his prior statements. Perhaps more importantly, we find that his prior beliefs fluctuated substantially, foreshadowing the variability of beliefs during his chairmanship.
One constant in Burns's beliefs was a conviction that inflation was very costly. From the late 1950s on, Burns railed against, to quote from the title of one of his talks, "the perils of inflation"
(reprinted in Burns, 1969, p. 286) . In a lecture in 1957, for example, he said, "we have slighted the injustice and hardships that flow from inflation, when in fact these have been multiplying for a (U.S. News, 7/14/69, p. 61). At his confirmation hearing Burns implied that an anti-inflationary gap could be created by lowering the natural rate rather than by raising actual unemployment. He stated: "I think we ought to be able in the years ahead to pursue, when we need to, a restrictive financial policy without significantly increasing unemployment. I have great faith in well-managed job banks. I think they will prove tremendously helpful" (U.S. Senate, 1969, p. 24) . Whatever the particulars of the mechanism, Burns's statements signaled the optimistic framework that led him to expect disinflation during his first year in office despite only a very mild downturn.
At other times, Burns's prior statements show the skepticism about the effectiveness of slack that was central to his views in the period 1971-73. Creeping inflation and increasing wage and price rigidity were a common theme in his writings, especially in the late 1950s. For example, in his 1959 presidential address to the American Economic Association he stated: "the once familiar parallelism of the short-term movements in the physical volume of total production, on the one hand, and the average level of wholesale or consumer prices, on the other, has become somewhat elusive" (Burns, 1969, p. 123) . And in 1967 he testified: "Unhappily, even a mild recession would probably not suffice to bring cost inflation to a halt under current conditions" (Burns, 1967, p. 127) . As in the 1970s, Burns concluded that this ineffectiveness of slack meant that policies other than aggregate demand restraint should be sought. He stated in 1957: "However necessary and helpful a balanced budget and a restrictive monetary policy may be in the age-old struggle against inflation, it is doubtful whether they alone can cope with the threat of creeping inflation" (Burns, 1969, p. 150) .
Finally, in the mid-1960s, Burns espoused the more realistic views that guided policy in the mid1970s. Arguing against the prevailing belief in a permanent inflation-unemployment tradeoff in 1967, he said: "Once forces of inflation have been released, it becomes very difficult to bring them under control without some sizeable readjustments in the economy" (Burns, 1969, p. 277 ). Burns also believed that the sustainable level of unemployment had risen over the previous decade. In 1965, he stated that "there are cogent grounds for believing that if the pressure of aggregate demand had remained at the boom level of 1956-57, the unemployment rate would still have been higher in recent years than it was then" (Burns, 1966, p. 42) . To rein in inflation, Burns rejected not only wage and price controls, but even voluntary guideposts (Burns, 1969, pp. 232-53) . Instead, he stressed "the need for prudent control of the money supply and the need for maintaining and enhancing the forces of competition" (p. 253; see also p. 284).
Reading Burns's statements in the mid-1960s, one can see not only the Burns who tightened substantially while the economy was reeling from the first oil price shock in 1974, but also the fine Federal Reserve chairman he could have been had his economic beliefs been less mercurial.
Miller
The First, consider the natural rate. In January 1977, Miller declared, "fiscal and monetary policies can be applied to reduce unemployment quickly -from 8 percent to 5½ percent (or perhaps even 5 percent) within two years without triggering a renewed bout of inflation" (Miller, 1977, p. 341) . For this statement to be consistent with a natural rate framework, Miller had to believe that the natural rate was 5 or 5½ percent -much lower than the estimates being mentioned at the Federal Reserve during this period.
Miller expressed views consistent with this optimistic estimate at his confirmation hearing (U.S. Senate, 1978, p. 20) .
Far more striking than his optimism about the natural rate were Miller's views on the ineffectiveness of slack. In 1977, Miller implied that both the level and duration of unemployment that would be needed to reduce inflation were very large. His explanation for this was that unemployment compensation and other social welfare programs had made workers unwilling to lower wage demands even in the face of high unemployment. He stated: "The Phillips' curve has an error. The real relationship is between inflation and uncompensated unemployment. To the extent that unemployment is compensated ... there is an overstatement of the economic impact of unemployment. ... The result is that a significant portion of the unemployed act in an economic sense as if they were employed, spend as if they had jobs" (Miller, 1977, p. 341, emphasis in original) . Miller reiterated this view at his confirmation hearing (U.S. Senate, 1978, p. 74) . The implication that he drew from his analysis was that: "If the economy is behaving as if the unemployment rate was lower, then we might as well pursue macroeconomic policies which will lower the unemployment rate in fact and at the same time improve the social fabric by offering more people the greater dignity and self respect that comes from having a decent job" (Miller, 1977, p. 341) .
At his confirmation hearing, Miller took his beliefs about the ineffectiveness of slack a step further. He asserted that unemployment not only failed to reduce inflation, it actually caused it. He stated:
under the ethical values in this Nation, unemployment also breeds inflation. Today there is no question that high rates of unemployment mean large Federal deficits and large
Federal deficits mean inflation.
So I think the answer is that we must fight both at the same time. I think the traditional connections between inflation and unemployment have been disrupted by social concepts that have resulted in the adoption of programs that would create higher deficits in times of economic distress (U.S. Senate, 1978, p. 38; see also pp. 56, 72) .
While this is not a view we see carrying weight in the FOMC during Miller's tenure, it is certainly indicative of the basic macroeconomic confusion that did hold sway.
The policy implication that Miller drew from his beliefs was that means other than aggregate demand restraint were needed to control inflation. Initially, his idea was "to employ selective demand and supply management to overcome bottlenecks or to increase availability of goods" (Miller, 1977, p. 340) . Among the specific controls and inducements he mentioned were selective consumer credit controls, an interest surcharge on loans for low priority purposes, a variable investment tax credit, a threeyear moratorium on strikes, workfare, and job-training programs (Miller, 1974, p. 16) . At his confirmation hearing Miller backed off somewhat from this notion of highly specific interventions, but he continued to advocate non-monetary approaches to controlling inflation. He testified: "The best chance for dampening down inflation is in an area where the Fed does not have direct control. That is, by trying to stimulate business fixed investment. ... that requires a policy on the fiscal side" (U.S. Senate, 1978, p. 84 ). This view that inflation was not a problem to be solved by monetary policy was one that Miller carried to the Federal Reserve, with severe consequences.
Volcker
In his writings and speeches before his confirmation hearing, Volcker expressed many of the views that became the hallmark of his tenure. He consistently extolled the benefits of low inflation and the critical importance of monetary policy in achieving it. In 1977 he stated, "over time, an excess supply of money contributes nothing to employment, nor to real income, nor to real wealth, but only to inflation" (Volcker, 1977, p. 24) . He went on to say, "My own judgment is that we already have ample evidence that strong inflationary forces … damage rather than help our prospects for employment and growth" (p.
27). His policy prescription was simple: "we will need to act to bring monetary growth targets gradually down to noninflationary levels" (p. 28). He recognized that such a policy would have costs, saying that "price stability is devoutly desired by most. But … policies to achieve that goal can have particular shortterm effects that may be distinctly unpopular" (Volcker, 1978, p. 333) .
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But, Volcker's statements before his confirmation hearing do not show that he had a fully realistic assessment of the natural rate and the output costs of disinflation, or that he believed it would be worth bearing very large output costs to reduce inflation. For example, at a time when unemployment was slightly under 7 percent, he stated that in addition to gradually eliminating inflation, "we also must sustain the momentum of expansion and cut into unemployment" (Volcker, 1978, p. 333) . He also said: "The 'optimistic' view suggests that at a time when unemployment is still above 'full employment' …, some moderation of inflation should still be possible as unemployment is reduced" (p. 337).
At his confirmation hearing, however, Volcker expressed precisely the views that led him to undertake the most aggressive disinflation in Federal Reserve history. He argued forcefully that inflation was harmful in the long run, and thus that inflation control should be a central goal of policy. He said, "I believe that ultimately the only sound foundation for the continuing growth and prosperity of the American economy is much greater price stability" (U.S. Senate, 1979, p. 16) . He repeatedly made statements such as, "The most fundamental thing we can do … is to deal with internal inflation" (p. 8).
He described zero inflation as his ultimate goal (p. 13), though he did caution that it "must be considered an objective that can be reached only over a period of years and toward which we should move in prudent steps" (p. 15).
Volcker also made clear that he believed that the natural rate was at least in the vicinity of 6 percent. He testified: "earlier this year …, with the unemployment rate still not much below 6 percent … we had at the same time evidence of the beginnings and the actuality of shortages in some industries, of insufficient capacity, rising price pressures. All of which suggested that the answer to that remaining unemployment problem wasn't going to be found in overall demand measures" (U.S. Senate, 1979, pp. 17-18) . Thus, he clearly understood that substantial unemployment would be required to reduce inflation.
Nevertheless, he argued that the benefits of low inflation were large enough that it was worth bearing those costs. In response to a question about a study suggesting "a terrific price" to reducing inflation through monetary policy, Volcker responded: "I don't think we have any substitute for seeking an answer to our problems in the context of monetary discipline" (p. 5). Similarly, in response to a question expressing concern about unemployment rising to "7 or 9 [percent] or somewhere in that range," Volcker stressed the importance of achieving "stability" in terms of "domestic inflation" (by which he meant low inflation, not stable high inflation) and "international markets" (p. 18).
Greenspan
Greenspan's prior writings and confirmation hearing presage the views that have dominated Federal Reserve policymaking under his leadership. Greenspan was a consistent proponent of the view that low inflation is critical to long-run growth. In 1979, for example, he argued that inflation "skews the investment pattern toward shorter-lived projects," and away from research and other long-term investments. As a result, inflation was causing "our economic system … to lose its productive efficiency" (Greenspan, 1979) . At his confirmation hearing, he said: "it is absolutely essential that [the Federal
Reserve's] central focus be on restraining inflation because if that fails, then we have very little opportunity for sustained long-term economic growth" (U.S. Senate, 1987, p. 29) .
Greenspan believed that the only way to achieve low inflation was through monetary and fiscal policy. In a 1977 debate with Arthur Okun, he stated, "A necessary and sufficient condition [to eliminating inflation] is to adopt a monetary and fiscal policy that would allow unit money supply to grow at a rate that implies a noninflationary price increase" (Greenspan and Okun, 1977, p. 120 (Economic Report, 1977, pp. 48-51 ). Greenspan's later statements on these issues, however, sound less realistic. In 1977, he argued that low inflation was so beneficial that "A phased, moderate decline in the rate of growth in money supply need not have any significant negative effects on real growth" (Greenspan and Okun, 1977, p. 117) . In 1978, he stated that "Our problem is one for which we have no firm theoretical understanding," and that the United States was experiencing "a condition of chronic inflation in a period of less than full utilization of resources" (Daly, 1979, p. 24) .
Importantly, even when Greenspan was espousing questionable views about the determinants of inflation, his policy prescriptions were sensible. In 1978 he stated, "The fact is that we know the solution" to high inflation -monetary and fiscal restraint that would increase unemployment (Daly, 1979, p. 25) . Furthermore, he made clear that inflation control was worth an extremely high price. At his confirmation hearing, a senator suggested that the tight monetary policy of the early 1980s was excessive.
Greenspan defended the policy, saying, "we allowed our system to take on inflationary biases which threw us into such a structural imbalance that, in order to preserve the integrity of the system, the Federal
Reserve had to do what it did. Had it not acted in the way which it did at that time, the consequences would have been far worse than what subsequently happened" (U.S. Senate, 1987, p. 35 beliefs and to reject those whose frameworks are likely to lead them astray.
APPENDIX ESTIMATION OF THE EX ANTE REAL INTEREST RATE
To estimate the ex ante real interest rate, we begin with data on the three-month Treasury bill rate in the secondary market, converted to quarterly averages. We subtract off the log difference of the quarterly GDP deflator (at an annual rate) to create a series on the ex post real rate. 11 The Fisher identity implies that the ex post real rate equals the ex ante real rate minus unanticipated inflation. If expectations are rational, the expectation of unanticipated inflation using information known at the time the expectation is formed is zero. Therefore, if one regresses the ex post rate on current and lagged information, the fitted values provide an estimate of the ex ante real rate (Mishkin, 1981) . To implement this procedure, we use as explanatory variables the contemporaneous value and four lags of each of the nominal Treasury bill rate, the growth rate of the GDP deflator, and the growth rate of real GDP, as well 1939Q1 1952Q1 1955Q1 1958Q1 1961Q1 1964Q1 1967Q1 1970Q1 1973Q1 1976Q1 1979Q1 1982Q1 1985Q1 1988Q1 1991Q1 1994Q1 1997Q1 2000Q1 2003Q1 Percent Martin Eccles Burns Volcker Greenspan Source: See appendix. The observations for 1941Q2 to 1951Q1 are missing because we exclude those years from the estimation. The vertical lines show the quarters in when each Federal Reserve chairman's tenure began.
before 1947 we begin with annual data from the BEA. We then derive quarterly values of both series using the quarterly series constructed by Balke and Gordon (1986, pp. 789-810) . Specifically, we derive new series that have quarter-to-quarter percentage changes within each year equal to those in the corresponding Balke-Gordon series, but year-to-year percentage changes equal to those in the annual BEA estimates.
